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COUNTED OUT TWICE-POWER,
REPRESENTATION & THE "USUAL
RESIDENCE RULE" IN THE
ENUMERATION OF PRISONERS: A STATE-




The American incarcerated population, 2,212,475 persons strong,' is
larger than the population of the fourth-largest city in the United States,2
commands a greater population than fifteen individual states, 3 and contains
more people than the three smallest states combined.4 If the incarcerated
population of the United States were a state of its own, it would qualify for
five Electoral College votes. As the United States emerges from two
consecutive close national elections featuring razor-thin margins of victory,
J.D. Candidate 2006, Northwestern University School of Law
PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL.: PRISONERS 1N 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govIbjs/pub/
pdf/p04.pdf.
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, at
30, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf [hereinafter
Statistical Abstract 2003] (showing the population of the fourth largest U.S. city, Houston,
TX, to be 2,010,000).
3 Id. at 20.
4 id
5 Burt Constable, Some Arresting Facts about Our Fastest-Growing, Fourth-Largest
City, CHI. DAILY HERALD, June 30, 2001, § 1, at 11.
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commentators have noted that felon disenfranchisement may have
influenced the outcome of these elections.6
Lurking below the surface of felon disenfranchisement analysis lays a
nascent discourse on the effect of mass incarceration on the complicated
world of state and federal legislative apportionment. Specifically, a small
but growing number of journalists, legal and academic scholars,7 and
politicians have started to take note of the profound effect of the U.S.
Census Bureau's "usual residence rule" - the method by which the Census
Bureau determines where to count people - and its application to those
behind bars.8 A November 2004 New York Times editorial, for example,
called for a change in the way prisoners are counted by the U.S. Census
Bureau, noting that in the past year at least three major reports have made
the same recommendation. 9  Each of these reports outlines just how
significantly the application of this 200-year-old method of population
6 Voting rights scholars Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen have shown that in 2000 Al
Gore would have won Florida by some 80,000 votes had felons not been disenfranchised.
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777, 792 (2002).
7 See, e.g., Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial
Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE
L. REv. 587 (2004); Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, Counting Matters: Prison Inmates,
Population Bases, and "One Person, One Vote", 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 229 (2004);
Rosanna M. Taormina, Comment, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the
"Usual Residence" Principle, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 431 (2003); Sanford Levinson, One
Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1269 (2002); Elizabeth
D. Mehling, Comment, Where Do Prisoners Live: Do Taxpayers Have a Valid Legal Claim
for Lost Federal Funds Resulting from the Census Bureau's Enumeration Standards
Pertaining to Prisoners?, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 47 (2000).
8 In particular, a great number of academic studies, reports, and newspaper articles have
been devoted to the effect of this policy in New York State. Peter Wagner, a Soros Justice
Fellow from the Prison Policy Initiative has undertaken numerous studies on the subject -
both in New York and around the country. Mr. Wagner has championed the cause of reform
across the nation, though particularly in New York. See generally Prisoners of the Census,
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ (last visted Oct. 9, 2005); Prison Policy Initiative,
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
9 Editorial, Jailhouse Blues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at A26; see PATRICIA ALLARD &
KIRSTEN D. LEVINGSTON, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. AT NYU SCH. OF L., ACCURACY
COUNTS: INCARCERATED PEOPLE & THE CENSUS (2004), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/cj/RV4AccuracyCounts.pdf; ROSE HEYER & PETER
WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIvE, Too BIG TO IGNORE: How COUNTING PEOPLE IN
PRISONS DISTORTED CENSUS 2000 (2004), available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/
toobig/toobig.shtml; SARAH LAWRENCE & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY
CTR, THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF IMPRISONMENT: MAPPING AMERICA'S PRISON EXPANSION
(2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410994_mappingprisons.pdf; see
also Editorial, Phantom Constituents in the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at A16.
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enumeration, the "usual residence rule," affects the distribution of
representative power.' 0
Ever since the first U.S. Census in 1790, the Census Bureau has used
the concept of "usual residence" to determine who lives in which state."
The Census Bureau defines "usual residence" as "the place where the
person lives and sleeps most of the time. This place is not necessarily the
same as the person's voting residence or legal residence."'1 2 This particular
enumeration method comes neither from the U.S. Constitution nor from a
federal statute, but rather from an administrative determination that such a
rule would be an effective means of enumeration.13
While the fundamental constitutional mandate of the Census Bureau-
to count the number of people in each state in order to apportion
Representatives of the United States amongst the several States 14-has not
changed since 1787, the ancillary use of the collected data has dramatically
increased in importance. 15 Today, Census Bureau data is used extensively,
not only to apportion population to both state and federal legislative
districts, but also for the annual allocation of more than $140 billion in
formula-based federal grants to state and local jurisdictions. 16 With such
widespread vital uses of Census data, one can easily see how imperative it
is that the Census Bureau counts accurately, counts fairly, and counts
people in the right place.
Generally, the "usual residence rule" works well; people are counted at
their homes-normally where they sleep most of the time, vote, and work.
However, when this policy is applied to prisoners who spend a generally
short period of time behind bars in prisons located far from their true
homes, distortions arise.17
10 Editorial, Jailhouse Blues, supra note 9.
11 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT CENSUS 2000 RESIDENCE RULES,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/resid-rules.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2005) [hereinafter USUAL RESIDENCE RULE].
12 Id.
13 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (directing that representation be enumerated
through a decennial census); Act of March 1, 1790, ch. II, § 1, 1 Stat. 101 (directing the
"marshals of the several districts" to enumerate their residents, though without specifying a
particular enumeration method).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
15 HEYER & WAGNER, supra note 9.
16 LAWRENCE & TRAvIS, supra note 9, at 3.
17 Lotke & Wagner, supra note 7, at 588. The average U.S. Congressional district
population after the 2000 Census was 646,952 people. KAREN M. MILLS, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 1 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbrOl-7.pdf. After the 2000 Census the average state Senate district population was
106,362 people and the average state House district was 37,564 people. National
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When the Census Bureau counts prisoners in the decennial census, it
applies the "usual residence rule," and counts prisoners as residents of the
prison in which they eat and sleep during the period of their incarceration.
18
However, in most states the prisoners legally reside in the community in
which they were arrested.' 9 The prisoners' pre-incarceration community is
normally the community in which they would use the services of their
political representatives and where they would vote (were they able).20
Prior to 1970, this was not a significant problem, as the number of people
behind bars was generally stable and not as significant as it is today.2'
However, since 1970, the U.S prison population has grown more than
600%, and continues its torrid growth.22 Much of the growth in prison
facilities has been in rural areas, while the majority of inmates come from
urban areas.23 Thus, an increasing number of people are counted by the
Census Bureau as residents of communities that do not reflect their true,
legal homes. As a result, a smaller permanent resident population in the
rural, prisoner-hosting communities elects representatives than in those
urban communities that tend to export prisoners. This means that prisoner-
exporting communities experience a dilution of their relative voting power,
while prisoner-importing communities experience a corresponding
strengthening of their relative voting power.
For example, New York City produces nearly 66% of all New York
State prisoners. 24 However, more than 91% of prisoners are incarcerated
outside of New York City.25 Thus, when the Census Bureau applies the
"usual residence rule" to prisoners in New York, 91% of the prisoners from
New York City are counted as residents outside of New York City, despite
the fact that they legally remain New York City residents.26 As a result, the
Conference of State Legislatures, Constituents per State Legislative District: Legislatures
Ranked by Size, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/cnstprst.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2005). Thus, distortions can have a more powerful per representative effect in state
legislatures than in the U.S. Congress.
18 See U.S CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT CENSUS 2000 RESIDENCE RULES: PEOPLE IN
HOSPITALS, PRISONS OR OTHER INSTITUTIONS, http://www.census.gov/population/www/
censusdata/residrules.html#Inst (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
19 See infra Part 1.A.
20 id.
21 See infra Part II.A.1.
22 id.
23 Id.
24 PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS: PRISONERS AND
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interests of rural, prisoner-hosting communities in New York are
overrepresented, and the interests of prisoner-exporting communities are
underrepresented in the state and federal government.
While there have been numerous attempts to modify the
implementation of the "usual residence rule" from statehouses to the United
States Congress, these efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.27 These
efforts, however, continue to gain momentum.
By examining the causes and effects of prison expansion, the U.S.
Census Bureau enumeration policies, and the relevant case law regarding
state and federal legislative apportionment, this comment will evaluate
various solutions to this growing problem. In particular, this comment will
examine the legality of state based adjustments to Census data which aim to
correct the flaws that the "usual residence rule" creates when applied to
America's swollen prison population.
One can see the effects of the Census Bureau's "usual residence rule"
on prison populations when examining every state. However, while
looking at the problem from the perspective of any individual state, as well
as from a national legal and policy perspective, this comment will focus on
the causes, effects, and solutions to the problem caused by the "usual
residence rule" in Illinois. Beyond being the home of this journal, Illinois
proves a useful case study for a number of reasons. First, Illinois has one
large city, Chicago, which exports a large number of prisoners to
geographically distant prisons.28 As a result, one can clearly see the effects
of the Census Bureau's prisoner enumeration method in Illinois. Second,
prison growth in Illinois has largely mirrored the growth seen throughout
the United States.2 9 Finally, legislation of the very type examined by this
comment has been introduced in the Illinois General Assembly.3°
Part I will present background on the census and the "usual residence
rule," including, in Part L.A, an historical and modem background on the
role and legal directives of the U.S. Census Bureau. In Part I.B, an analysis
of how the Census Bureau's enumeration policy affects representation will
be presented.
Part II will more exhaustively examine the scope of the problem.
First, in Part II.A, both national and Illinois-based analyses of the growth of
prison population and prison facilities will be undertaken. In Part II.B, the
effect of the Census Bureau's "usual residence rule" upon legislative
redistricting and population-based funding will be examined.
27 See infra note 195.
28 See infra Part II.A.2
29 See infra Part II.A.
30 See infra note 195.
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Part III will examine the relevant case material on the subject. Since
the seminal cases of Reynolds v. Sims 31 and Wesberry v. Sanders,32 there
have been hundreds of cases which have clarified the judicially imposed
legislative apportionment mantra-one person, one vote. The cases will be
examined by first looking at relevant federal Congressional
reapportionment cases in Part III.A and relevant state legislative
reapportionment cases in Part III.B. Additionally, Part III.C will examine
cases which have attempted judicially to alter Census Bureau enumeration
procedures.
Part IV will examine the efficacy and legality of various census
adjustment options potentially available to any individual state. Further,
Part IV will argue that under guidance offered in Reynolds, Wesberry and
their progeny a state may take back the reins from a recalcitrant Census
Bureau to correct the inequities created by the "usual residence rule."
Finally, in Part V, this comment will argue that the Census Bureau's
use of the "usual residence rule" to enumerate prisoners creates striking
inequities and that in the absence of federal action state legislatures must
make a bold step to ensure that we are all counted accurately, counted
fairly, and counted in the right place.
I. COUNTING PRISONERS: AN INTRODUCTION To How PRISON TOWNS
REAP LEGISLATIVE POWER FROM THE UNITED STATES' MASSIVE PRISON
POPULATION
A. THE INTRICACIES OF ENUMERATION: HOW THE CENSUS BUREAU
FULFILLS ITS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, a bitter dispute arose that
nearly ended the United States of America before it began.33  Some
members of the Convention advocated a system of government whereby
each state would have an equal number of votes in Congress, while others
were adamant that states with greater population should be afforded greater
power. 34 Eventually, Benjamin Franklin led the delegates to the Great
Compromise-a system of governance whereby one house of the federal
legislature, the House of Representatives, would be comprised of a
proportional number of Representatives from each state based on the states'
relative populations, while another legislative house, the Senate, would be
31 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
32 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33 See id. at 10-14.
34 rj
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comprised of an equal number of Senators from each state. 35 The resultant
Constitution of the United States spelled out the details of that compromise,
stating:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.
36
This principle of representation was amended by the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.37 The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that "[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers," 38 "counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
3 9
According to this Constitutional mandate, the First Decennial Census
Act4° directed the U.S. Census Bureau to enumerate the people of the
several States in their "usual place of abode."4t In order to accomplish this
straightforward, though not insignificant task, the U.S. Census Bureau
established the "usual residence rule" in 1790.42 Rather than track down
and validate one's official legal residence or domicile-a legal
determination made at the state level based on different state laws-the
Census Bureau would merely have to determine where one normally ate
and slept, most of the time.43
At the Constitutional Convention, and in the debates for the ratification
of the new U.S. Constitution, delegates and proponents of the Constitution
argued that any desire a state might have to increase its population in order
to achieve greater numbers in the Congress would be offset by the state's
35 id.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Act of March 1, 1790, ch. II, § 1, 1 Stat. 101.
41 ALLARD & LEVINGSTON, supra note 9, at 9 (citing 1 Stat. 101).
42 See Oversight of the 2000 Census: Examining the Bureau's Policy to Count Prisoners,
Military Personnel, and Americans Residing Overseas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Census of the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 21 (1999), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106house-hearings&docid =
f:60341 .pdf [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
43 USUAL RESIDENCE RULE, supra note 11.
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desire to limit its taxation responsibility.44 While we have moved away
from taxation based on state population,45 representation continues to be
drawn from such figures, eliminating this counterbalance.46
Today, the Census Bureau is charged with taking a decennial census
every ten years beginning on April 1, 1980, the "decennial census date", "in
such form and content as [the Secretary of Commerce] may determine. 47
Within nine months of the census date, the Census Bureau is required to
transmit to the President the total population of the states.48 The President
must then transmit a statement to the Congress within one week after the
beginning of the first session of Congress after the census showing "the
whole number of persons in each state . . . and the number of
Representatives to which each State would be entitled" under the statutorily
approved apportionment formula. 49 Each state is entitled to the number of
representatives shown in the President's statement.50 Finally, within fifteen
days of receipt of the President's statement, the Clerk of the House of
Representatives must submit to the "executive of each State" the number of
representatives to which that state is entitled.5'
While the Census Bureau's constitutionally-mandated responsibility
remains today, Census data is used by a whole host of public and private
institutions. As a result, the Census Bureau's mantra reflects its mission-
"Helping You Make Informed Decisions." 52  Census data forms a
cornerstone of government policy-making, business decision-making,
statistical research, and a whole host of public and private population
analyses of such things as marriage rates, age, gender, economic health,
racial composition, per capita income, population density, and migration
patterns, amongst others. 53  Most importantly for the purposes of this
analysis, Census data is used by state governments to apportion political
44 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison) ("By extending the rule [of
Census-based apportionment] to both objects [taxation and representation], the States will
have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite
impartiality."); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION, FACTFINDER FOR THE
NATION (2000), http://www.Census.gov/prod/2000pubs/cff-4.pdf ("[S]tates' wishes to report
few people in order to lower their shares in the war debt would be offset by a desire for the
largest possible representation in Congress.").
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
46 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2.
41 13 U.S.C.A. § 141(a) (West 2005).
48 Id. § 141(b).
49 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a(a) (West 2005).
" Id. § 2a(b).
51 id.
52 See U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/.
53 HEYER & WAGNER, supra note 9.
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representation at the state and federal levels and to form political districts
from which such representatives will be drawn and by the federal
government to disburse billions of dollars a year in funding to local
government agencies.54 In short, the data the U.S. Census Bureau collects
and disseminates to public and private agencies is an integral part of our
society. It is clear, therefore, that any enumeration method the Census
Bureau employs should be squarely based on a strong, clear policy that
takes into account the underlying purposes for which this data is used, and
not merely what is the most convenient method for the agency charged with
its collection.
While for a great number of people their "usual residence" is the same
as their legal and permanent residence, we live in an increasingly mobile
society which places strains on the Census Bureau's "usual residence rule."
Beyond normal migration, students, domestic and overseas military and
federal employees, institutionalized disabled people, and prisoners represent
large classes of people who regularly eat and sleep in places that are not
their actual legal homes.55 As a result, the Census Bureau has occasionally
modified the application of the "usual residence rule" to fairly and
effectively enumerate people in these classes. For example, in 1950 the
Census Bureau changed its enumeration method for students.56 This change
was the result of a study by the Census Bureau's Technical Advisory
Committee on General Population Statistics, which discovered that large
numbers of students were not being counted at either their parents' home
address or at their school address.57 Additionally, in 1990-following a
last-minute effort by the Defense Department, several members of
Congress, and the Secretary of Commerce58 the Census Bureau decided to
include overseas Americans working for the federal government at their
"home of record," or the address at which those individuals resided prior to
taking up their job overseas.59 However, each of the above-cited classes of
citizens differs from prisoners in important respects. For example, in many
communities, students are actual members of the communities in which
they are enumerated; they are allowed to vote in that community, they are
54 id.
55 See generally Prisoners of the Census, supra note 8; see also Borough of Bethel Park
v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 1971).
56 ALLARD & LEVINGSTON, supra note 9, at 11. See generally PETER WAGNER, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE, ACTUAL CONSTITUENTS: STUDENTS AND POLITICAL CLOUT tN NEW YORK,
(2004), available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/students/studentreport.shtml.
57 id.
58 The Bureau of the Census is organized under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Commerce. 13 U.S.C. § 2 (2005).
59 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 793-94 (1992).
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encouraged to interact with members of the community, the community
generally actively wants them there and will represent their interests, and
they benefit from the services that their enumeration affords-in short, they
draw benefit from their enumeration in that community. 6° Further, as we
shall see shortly, the movement of prisoners to locations other than their
home address is more numerous, more concentrated, and more predictable
than these other classes of people.
According to Peter Wagner of the Prison Policy Initiative, the majority
of states have either a constitutional or legislative provision stating that
prisoners cannot lose their legal residence as a result of incarceration. 6'
While Illinois appears to have had such a statute as of 1877,62 no such
statute remains on the books today.63 However, Illinois common law, like
common law around the nation, clearly states that one's legal residence
cannot be abridged by incarceration. 64 Thus, the residence that a prisoner
would use to vote (if he was able), to pay taxes, to access state courts, to
invoke federal diversity jurisdiction in accessing the federal courts, and to
seek the services of a political representative would be based on his or her
pre-incarceration legal residence, and not the prison in which he or she
temporarily resides.
One of the most difficult to reconcile portions of the "usual residence
rule" is that the purpose of the census-to apportion political representation
which is to be wielded by elected officials on behalf of their constituents-
is not in accord with the law on how that purpose is effectuated. Every
state determines its own voting procedures based upon its own residency
requirements in order to allow an individual to cast a ballot in a particular
60 HEYER & WAGNER, supra note 9.
61 Telephone Interview with Peter Wagner, Soros Justice Fellow, Prison Policy Initiative,
in Northampton, Mass. (Dec. 3, 2004).
62 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.A.6 (2000).
63 It is unclear when and why this statute was removed from the books.
64 See Illinois v. Carman, 52 N.E.2d 197, 198 (Ill. 1943) ("involuntary imprisonment
cannot change a man's legal residence");
The matter of domicile is largely one of intention and, hence, is primarily a question of fact.
Once a domicile is established, it is presumed to continue, and the burden of proof in such cases
rests on the party who attempts to establish that a change of domicile occurred. It is manifest
that very slight circumstances often decide the question of domicile, and the determination is
made based on a preponderance of the evidence in favor of some particular place as a domicile.
In addition, in light of the factual issue to be decided, the resolution of the question of domicile
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, for precedents with different
factual patterns are of slight assistance.
In re Estate of Elson, 458 N.E.2d 637, 642 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) (citations omitted).
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legislative district.65 Thus, legal residence does not necessarily comport
with usual residence. Members of a traveling circus, for example, by
Census Bureau policy are counted at the place they are located on Census
Day. Therefore, they help draw political representation to the city in which
they are performing on Census Day even though they may be there for only
one day and by law vote in a different district.
One court in Illinois has noted this oddity. In the case of Oswego
Community Consolidated School District Number No. 434 v. Goodrich,66 a
community desired to hold an election regarding the formation of a school
district within the community.67 However, the Illinois School Code
required that a community population of 1500 was a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to the calling of an election of this sort.68 At issue was the
inclusion of several residents who for one reason or another were not in
town on the local Census Day. 69 The court noted, "It would certainly be an
anomaly to hold that these persons are not residents for the purpose of
determining the population of the district, but that they are residents for the
purpose of voting on the proposition to organize the district., 70 The judge
thus deemed it inconsistent that residents who were otherwise eligible to
vote as a result of their legal residence should be excluded due to their
usual residence. This is the exact situation we face with prisoners, yet no
federal judge has ever issued such a ruling.
These dichotomies-policy versus law, usual versus legal-can have
serious effects on the interests of the represented when sufficient numbers
of people with a common interest are counted in a geographical subdivision
with a competing interest. When one adds to the equation that those
enumerated cannot even wield the power of their numbers because they are
disenfranchised, serious problems arise. When Chicago successfully
boosted its political representation through the Census Bureau's inclusion
of 112 circus performers temporarily present in the City of Chicago on
Census Day 2000, it did not have an altogether dramatic effect upon the
representational power of the community.71 However, when a particular
political subdivision has 20% of its residents behind bars with no effective
political tools with which to represent their interests, the social, economic,
65 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 536 (1969).
66 171 N.E.2d 816 (1961).
67 Id. at 817.
61 Id. at 818.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 820.
71 Evan Osnos & Flynn McRoberts, In Census, Count 'Em If You Can; Rules Let Towns
Add To Their Rolls, CHI. TRB., Apr. 9, 2000, at C1.
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and political ramifications start to unfold in a far more dramatic, and
potentially detrimental manner.
B. THE RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF THE USUAL RESIDENCE RULE ON
REPRESENTATION
When the "usual residence rule" is applied to the huge number of
prisoners incarcerated in the United States, the result is that the
representational strength of their presence in downstate 72 correctional
facilities is transferred from their home community to the situs of their
incarceration. 3 All too often, those downstate communities which house
prisoners are interested in drawing jobs, political power, and financial
strength from incarcerated, imported constituents, rather than addressing the
serious crime problem in our cities and our society as a whole.74 Thus, the
interests of the non-incarcerated, vote-eligible free population in these
communities can run contrary to the interests of the prisoners from whom
the downstate communities draw strength. 75 As a result, political power is
shifted from those communities most afflicted by crime to those
communities most interested in gaining from incarceration-potentially at
the expense of any alternative means of retribution, crime prevention, drug
treatment, or rehabilitation.76 As has been pointed out by a leading
commentator on the subject, the transfer of political power has dulled one
of the most important counter-balances to the economic strength of the
prison industrial complex: the power of the democratic populace.77
In forty-eight out of fifty states and the District of Columbia, prisoners
are not allowed to vote while incarcerated.78 As a result of the Census
Bureau's enumeration policy, more than twenty counties in the United
72 For the purposes of this comment, which focuses on Illinois, I use the term
"downstate" to represent those predominantly distant, rural areas where the largely urban,
Chicago-resident inmates are housed in Illinois Department of Corrections facilities. While
the geographic nature of the term may not apply in other states, the sentiment remains the
same. In New York, for example, New York City is the only large city in the state and
"upstate", the appropriate geographical equivalent of "downstate", would refer to the same
communities.
73 Peter Wagner, Locked Up Then Counted Out: Prisoners and the Census, FORTUNE





78 Only Maine and Vermont allow those convicted of a felony the right to vote. THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.
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States have more than 20% of their residents behind bars.79 In these twenty
counties in particular, and to a lesser extent in the hundreds of counties
nationwide with significant prison populations, legislators are all too happy
to claim the extra power and money their prison populations command,
though not necessarily all too eager to represent the interests of those who
buoy their political fortunes. For example, in Rhode Island, State
Representative Peter Palumbo has said of his prison population windfall:
"All these years the prison has caused me grief with my constituents. Now
maybe it will help with redistricting." 80 In Ina, Illinois, Mayor Andy
Hutchens has claimed that as state and federal tax revenues are figured per
capita, a prison population which places no strains on city services is a
permanent windfall.81 "It really figures out this way," Hutchens said,
"[t]his little town of 450 people is getting the tax money of a town of 2,700
.. [a]nd those people in that prison can't vote me out of office." 82 Given
that prisoners are a source of increasing political and economic power, it is
not surprising that the leaders of these downstate communities have gone
from saying "not in my backyard," to "yes, in my backyard.,
83
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF PRISONERS AND THE CONCOMITANT
GROWTH OF PRISON FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
SPECIFICALLY IN ILLINOIS
1. The Growth in the United States
The relevance and dramatic results of the U.S. Census Bureau's "usual
residence rule" have grown in national importance over the past twenty
years as incarceration rates have skyrocketed.8 4 As is well-known and
documented, the growth in the number of prisoners and concomitant growth
in the number of prison facilities in the United States over the course of the
79 Rose Heyer & Peter Wagner, Twenty-One Counties Have Twenty One Percent of Their
Population in Prisons and Jails, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, Apr. 19, 2004,
http://www.prisonersoftheCensus.org/news/fact- 19-4-2004.shtml.
80 WAGNER, supra note 24.
81 Paul Street, The Political Consequences of Racist Felony Disenfranchisement, BLACK
COMMENTATOR, Dec. 11, 2003, http://www.blackcommentator.com/68/
68 street_prisons.html.
82 id.
83 LAWRENCE & TRAvIS, supra note 9, at 14.
84 Id. at 2.
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past twenty years have been higher than at any time in our history. 5 The
United States had six times as many prisoners in state and federal
penitentiaries in 2003 as in 1970.86 This rate of incarceration, nearly one in
every 140 Americans in 2003, gives the United States the highest reported
rate of incarceration in the world.87 Indeed, the U.S. rate of incarceration
shows no signs of slowing down-from mid-2002 to mid-2003, state and
federal prisoner growth rates were higher than at any point since 1999-
higher than in 2000 and 2001 combined.88
The increased incarceration rate means that the Census Bureau's
enumeration of prisoners at their place of incarceration rather than at their
home address has increased by 318%; more than one million more prisoners
were counted in 2000 than were in the 1980 census.89
While prisoners largely originate from urban centers, prisons have
been constructed at increasing distances from those urban centers in
geographically dispersed downstate communities. 90 In fact, a new rural
prison has been opened on average every fifteen days in the United States in
the last ten years.9' This fact is demonstrated by examining the number of
counties in the United States containing prisons. In 1979, 133 U.S. counties
claimed a prison.92 Today, more than 330 claim one.93
2. The Growth in Illinois
The State of Illinois has been one of the leaders in the national prison
growth rate. In the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century, the
number of state prisons grew by 73% across the United States.94 Illinois
ranked seventh in terms of the total number of prisons with forty. 95 In
"s Id. at 42.




89 LAWRENCE & TRAvIS, supra note 9, at 6.
90 Id. at 36 (In a study of the counties where inmates are actually incarcerated and where
they are convicted in Georgia, Ohio, Texas, California and Florida, Lawrence and Travis
note that "the largest sources of prisoners were very much aligned with the major cities in a
state.... At the same time, the counties of imprisonment were more widely dispersed across
the states.").
91 Douglas Clement, Big House on the Prairie, FEDGAZETTE, Jan. 2002, at
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/02-01/house.cfm.
92 LAWRENCE & TRAVIS, supra note 9, at 13.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 8.
9' Id. at 10.
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1979, by contrast, Illinois had only twelve prisons; Illinois has experienced
an increase of more than 300% in less than thirty years.96 The total number
of counties in Illinois with one or more prisons has grown from 7% to
28%. 9 7  Accordingly, more Illinois counties have seen prisoner-swollen
census counts, resulting in more widespread representational flaws.
Only one of the new Illinois Department of Corrections facilities is in
the northeastern part of the state (home to Chicago), and very few were
added to the northern portion of the state.98 In fact, while 66% of the
prisoners entering Illinois Department of Corrections facilities in 2004 were
from Cook County99 and the surrounding communities,100 99% of the cells
are outside of Cook County."
°"
As in many states, incarceration for drug offenses in Illinois has grown
dramatically in the last several decades.10 2 The increase in admissions for
drug crimes has resulted in a higher proportion of incoming inmates facing
relatively shorter sentences. 0 3 In 2002, 28,229 inmates were released from
Illinois Department of Corrections facilities.' °4 These inmates had an
average prison stay of 1.4 years, though fully half of them were in prison
for less than eight months. 05 The number of prisoners released in 2002
increased by 11.6% over 2001, and is up 60% over ten years ago. 10 6 Given
that the census is conducted relatively infrequently and increasing numbers
of prisoners are incarcerated for extremely short periods of time, it becomes
increasingly illogical to qualify those prisoners as residents of their prison
community.
The massive number of short-stay prisoners tends to overshadow the
increases in longer-stay prisoners when looking at data such as exit
numbers and average prison stay. 107 Yet, the number of prisoners in Illinois
96 Id.
" Id. at 14.
98 id.
99 Cook County, Illinois is home to the state's largest city, Chicago.
100 ILL. DEP'T. OF CORR., 2003 DEP'T. DATA (2004), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/
subsections/reports/department data/Department%20Data%202004.pdf.
101 HEYER & WAGNER, supra note 9.
102 ILL. DEP'T. OF CORR., STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 2003, at 6 (2004), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/reports/statisticaljpresentation-2003/2003StatisticalP
resentation.pdf [hereinafter ILL. CORR. STAT. PRES., 2003].
103 Id. at 4, 25 (supplemental meritorious good time, educational good conduct credits,
and earned time incentives have played a role in reducing the average length of
incarceration).






who will never be released is growing too, having nearly doubled between
1993 and 2002.108 As a result of the longer-term sentencing changes
enacted in the 1990s, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections
believes that the number of prisoners in Illinois will increase further in the
next couple of years.109  Such increases will further exacerbate the
representational transfer between those communities where prisoners tend
to originate and those communities that temporarily house them.
B. DOUBLE WHAMMY: THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVE INCARCERATION
AND THE APPLICATION OF THE "USUAL RESIDENCE RULE"
The U.S. Census Bureau's policy of counting prisoners at their place
of incarceration results in the Bureau's failure to live up to its mantra:
"Helping you make informed decisions."110  Businesses, governments,
policy makers, taxpayers, prisoners, and citizens are all misinformed. The
"usual residence rule" may be an effective way to efficiently acquire a
large, difficult-to-collect data set within an acceptable margin of error for
the majority of people. However, the sheer number of incarcerated
individuals living in dense"1' institutions sited in some of the least dense
communities in the country for relatively short periods of time" 2 clearly
presents a misleading data set.
Beyond apportionment, governments and public sector aid agencies
like the United Way use Census data to examine the financial well-being of
a community and anticipate any needs that community may develop.1 3 If
these agencies are looking at a good data set, they may be able to divert
resources to where they are needed most. For example, declining
populations are often a sign of economic weakness. 1 4 In the 2000 census,
one in fifty U.S. counties where Census Bureau data shows an expanding
108 In 1993 there were just over 800 prisoners who would never be released and in 2002
there were more than 1,400. Id. at 16.
109 Id. at xi.
110 See U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
111 At the close of 2002, the Illinois Department of Corrections adult incarceration
facilities were dramatically over capacity. In facilities designed to house 31,351 inmates
lived 42,693 inmates-36.2% over the stated capacity. Clearly, this population group lives
in housing of far greater density than found in any of the nation's dense metropolises, let
alone in the types of communities which generally house prisoners. I11. Corr. Stat. Pres.,
2003, supra note 102, at 4.
112 Id. at 26.
113 ALLARD & LEVINGSTON, supra note 9, at 3 (describing how the United Way of the
Texas Gulf utilizes Census data for aid delivery).
114 Peter Wagner, Prison Expansion Made 56 Counties with Declining Populations
Appear to be Growing in Census 2000, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, Apr. 26, 2004,
http://www.prisonersoftheCensus.org/news/fact-26-4-2004.shtml.
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population-a mark of a healthy economy-was actually shrinking when
prisoners were removed from the equation. 15 Thus, a government or aid
agency looking to spot potential economic distress before it ravages a
community would get a completely misleading picture of the well-being of
these counties.' 16 We can see this phenomenon when we look at Perry
County, Illinois, where Census Bureau data shows that the population grew
by 1,682 people, while a prisoner-adjusted picture shows that the true
members of the Perry County community, its free population, actually
shrunk by 492 people from 1990 to 2000.117 Perry County is one of seven
such counties in Illinois and fifty-six nationwide.' 18
In 2000, the African-American share of the Illinois incarcerated
population was 65% 1' 9 while the African American share of the total
Illinois population was only 15%. 120 As a result of the "usual residence
rule" and its application to prison populations, in 173 U.S. counties more
than 50% of the African-American residents are behind bars.'12  Illinois is
home to nineteen of these 173 counties - more than 10% of the national
total. 122 For example, Brown County, Illinois holds the highest percentage
of African-Americans in one community behind bars-99.6%.123 Brown
County's census-delineated African-American population in 2000 was
1,265 strong, yet all but five were incarcerated. 124 Clearly, the Census
Bureau's race statistics give an incorrect picture of American communities.
While there is debate about the amount of state and federal funding





119 ILL. DEP'T. OF CORR., DEP'T. DATA 2000, available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/
subsections/reports/department data/Department%20Data%202000.pdf (last visited Nov.
15, 2005).
120 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACTFINDER: QUICK TABLES: RACE, COMBINATIONS
OF Two RACES, AND NOT HISPANIC OR LATNO: 2000, http://factfinder.Census.gov/
servlet/QTTable?bm=y&-geo id=04000US 1 7&-qr name=DEC2000_SF I_U_QTP4&-
dsname=DEC 2000SF 1_U&-_lang=en&-_sse=on
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
121 Peter Wagner, Outdated Methodology Impairs Census Bureau's Count Of Black
Population, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, May 3, 2004, http://www.prisonersoftheCensus.org/







financial benefit to prison-hosting communities. 125 While prisoners do not
generally receive any benefit from the funding that goes to the community
just beyond the barbed wire fences, prisoners add to the population rolls,
and therefore the hosting community receives population-based funding
from state and federal governments for their name, but not for their benefit.
For example, Crest Hill, Illinois earns $270,000 from such population-
based assistance. 26 In Pontiac, Illinois, the City Administrator claims that
the town gains $120,000 annually as a result of prisoners being counted in
Pontiac by the Census Bureau. 127 In Johnson County, Illinois, the town's
budget nearly doubles to $3.4 million as a result of $1.5 million per year in
population-based funding received due to the census including Johnson
County's 2,955 prisoners as residents of Johnson County.
128
The vast majority of released inmates return to their home county after
incarceration. 29 Indeed, in Illinois the state provides exiting prisoners with
a bus ticket to their intended residence within the state.130 The vast majority
of the time, the intended destination is where they came from, their home
community. 131 Fifty-three percent of Illinois prisoners released in 2001
returned to the City of Chicago; 62% returned to Cook County. 32 Of the
prisoners who were released to Cook County, 66% had served less than one
year in prison. 33 An additional 15% had served between one and two
years.' 34  It is in Cook County where they will use the services that
population-based funding provides and where they will use their political
representatives, yet it is downstate communities which draw additional
representation and funding from the prisoners' presence on Census Day.
The value of political representation is dramatically skewed in a large
number of counties in Illinois, and across the nation. Of the ten states with
the most prisons in the United States, one in every five counties had 1% or
125 See generally Lotke & Wagner, supra note 7, at 601-05.
126 Molly Dugan, Census Dollars Bring Bounty To Prison Towns, CHI. REP., July, 2000.
127 id.
128 Osnos & McRoberts, supra note 71.
129 Dugan, supra note 126.
130 Telephone Interview with Officer Cotton, Big Muddy River Correctional Institution,
in Ina, Ill. (Dec. 3, 2004).
131 id.
132 NANCY G. LA VIGNE & CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, URBAN INST. JUST. POL'Y CTR., A
PORTRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN ILLINOIS 46 (2003), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410662_ILPortraitReentry.pdf. Ninety-seven percent of Illinois prisoners
released in 2001 were released to communities in Illinois. Id.
131 Id. at 50.
134 id.
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more of its census delineated population behind bars.135 In Illinois, 26 of
102 counties (25%) had more than 1% of their population behind bars,
twelve had 5% or more incarcerated, and two counties had more than 20%
of their apportioned residents in prison. 1
36
The Census Bureau's "usual residence rule" does not properly
compute local populations when millions of people incarcerated in state and
federal penitentiaries are fed into the enumeration machine as though they
were a part of a community to which they simply do not belong. The costs
are great-prison communities like Perry and Brown Counties receive
greater political representation and financial assistance at the cost of those
communities which tend to export prisoners-counties like Cook County. 37
III. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE CASE LAW
A. AS EQUAL AS IT GETS: APPORTIONMENT OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS AFTER WESBERRY V. SANDERS
The congressional apportionment standard was set by Wesberry v.
Sanders.138 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the congressional
districting in Georgia, which included some districts that contained two to
three times more people than other districts, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 The Court ruled, "We hold that,
construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that
Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that
as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another' s.,,
14
Following Wesberry, this quote has become the guiding principal in
congressional apportionment cases. As cases in this line have been more
fully fleshed out, it has become clear that the Supreme Court, and any court
hearing such a case, will apply a strict test to determine whether or not the
state has proposed a plan that is legitimately "as nearly as practicable."' 4'
In Karcher v. Daggett, the Supreme Court showed just how serious it
was about population equality in congressional districts. 142 In that case, the
135 LAWRENCE & TRAvis, supra note 9, at 32.
136 Id. at 31.
137 See supra Part II.B.
138 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
139 Id. at 7-8.
140 id.




New Jersey legislature was prohibited from implementing a
reapportionment plan in which the average district differed from the ideal
district size 143 by just .1384%, or about 726 people.1 44  However, the
legislature had rejected other, plans before it with even smaller average
deviations from the ideal.
145
More relevant to the issue at hand, however, was the Court's statement
that the "Census data count represents the 'best population data available,'
it is the only basis for good-faith attempts to achieve population
equality., 146  In making this statement, the Court cited Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler. 147 In Kirkpatrick, the Court held that Missouri's redistricting plan
did not satisfy the "as nearly as practicable" standard because the 25,000-
plus population difference between the largest and smallest districts was
avoidable. 48  Missouri attempted to justify deviations by saying that the
population differences between districts were the result of a legislative
attempt to factor in projected population shifts. 149 The Court stated that
"where substantial population shifts... can be predicted with a high degree
of accuracy, States that are redistricting may properly consider them ...
Findings as to population trends must be thoroughly documented and
applied throughout the state in a systematic, and not ad hoc, manner."
150
Missouri, however, did not make a consistent or systematic projection and
had relied on less accurate data than the Census Bureau provided.'
51
In Karcher, the Court left open the possibility that states could use data
other than the Census data or even modified Census data in determining
apportionment, stating, "Attempts to explain population deviations on the
basis of flaws in Census data must be supported with a precision not
achieved here."' 52 The Court continued, stating,
We have never denied that apportionment is a political process, or that state
legislatures could pursue legitimate secondary objectives as long as those objectives
were consistent with a good-faith effort to achieve population equality at the same
143 Ideal district size is the total apportionment base divided by the number of
congressional districts allocated to a particular state by the Congress. Id. at 728.
144 Id.
145 id.
146 Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
147 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
141 Id. at 534-35.
141 Id. at 535.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 529.
152 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983).
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time ... .T]he State bears the burden of justifying the differences withparticularity.15
The State must, however, show with some specificity that a particular objective
required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying on general
assertions. The showing required to justify population deviations is flexible,
depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests, the
consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availability
of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate
population equality more closely. By necessity, whatever deviations are justified
requires case-by-case attention to these factors.
Thus, the Supreme Court has given guidance that a clearly articulated,
consistently applied, legitimate state interest may justify either deviation
from strict population equality in congressional districts or the use of
modified Census data or alternative population estimates. However, no
court has upheld such a state policy and the rule remains fairly clear -
congressional districting is to be decided on a population basis without
regard to local interests or political deal-making. The intriguing possibility
remains, however, that a state with a clear, well-reasoned, consistently
applied policy could defend adjustments to Census data as a legitimate state
interest.
B. STATE PRIORITIES: STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AFTER
REYNOLDS V. SIMS
The seminal case in state legislative redistricting is Reynolds v. Sims,
which outlined the fundamental question in evaluating any legislative
districting scheme that a state may employ: "whether there has been any
discrimination against certain of the State's citizens which constitutes an
impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to
vote."'1 55  In Reynolds, the Court examined the apportionment of
representatives in the Alabama Legislature and found that a scheme which
weighted the votes of some at two, five, or ten times the power of votes in
another district violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
56
The Reynolds Court, enunciating the same basic principles as in
Wesberry, used high-minded American idealism in outlining the essential
nature of American democracy and the fundamental imperative that each
vote should be afforded essentially the same weight in any legislative
153 Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
154 Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
55 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
156 Id. at 569.
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districting scheme.' 57  The Court outlined the general principle for
legislative apportionment, stating, "The Equal Protection Clause demands
no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all
citizens, of all places as well as of all races."1 58  Indeed, the Court
recognized this distinction in guiding judicial inquiries, stating:
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations
from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the
apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state
legislature. But neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests,
are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from p9Opulation-based
representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests cast votes. 1
Clearly, then, a state may consider state interests in apportioning state
legislative districts to a degree that would be unacceptable in the
congressional apportionment context.
Following Wesberry, the Court in White v. Regester 60 established the
rule that prevails today: population in state legislative districts is not to
deviate by more than 10%.161 More specifically, because the total
population deviation is calculated by adding the deviation of the most
under-populated district to the deviation of the most over-populated district,
state legislatures generally try to make sure that no single district varies
from the ideal district size by greater than 5%. 162 However, neither federal
case law nor any statute indicates that a state must utilize data from the U.S.
Census Bureau in apportioning representatives. In fact, in Borough of
Bethel Park v. Stans, the Third Circuit stated that "although a state is
entitled to the number of representatives in the House of Representatives as
determined by the federal census, it is not required to use these census
figures as a basis for apportioning its own legislature. ' 63
117 Id. at 565-69.
158 Id. at 568.
159 Id. at 579-80.
160 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
161 Id. at 764 (citations omitted) (noting that differences between the largest and smallest
district may not be more than 10% when compared to the ideal district size would "not be
tolerable without justification 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation
of a rational state policy').
162 See Mahon v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 330-32 (1973).
163 449 F.2d 575, 583 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971).
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C. CHALLENGING THE COUNT: ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY THE "USUAL
RESIDENCE RULE" THROUGH LITIGATION
Challenges have been brought against the Census Bureau's application
of the "usual residence rule," though they have thus far been
unsuccessful.164
Bethel Park involved a challenge to the application of the "usual
residence rule" to "college students, members of the Armed Services
stationed in the United States, and inmates of institutions."'165  The
challengers asserted that as a result of the "usual residence rule" the
population of their districts was undercounted as the districts tended to
export more people in the aforementioned categories than they imported.
66
The court noted that the Constitution granted broad discretion to the Census
Bureau and did not dictate a specific enumeration method. 167 The court
held that the Census Bureau used a "historically reasonable means of
interpreting the Constitutional and legislative phrase 'whole number of
persons in each state."",168 The court reviewed the case of students and
members of the armed services at length, finding the "usual residence rule"
appropriate.169  The court gave one paragraph to institutional inmates,
including those in mental institutions, penitentiaries, homes for the needy,
and hospitals for the chronically ill.170 The court stated that as inmates have
"no other fixed place of abode and the length of their institutional stay is
often indefinite ... we think that the decision of the Bureau as to the place
of counting institution inmates has a rational basis.",
17'
The court's short treatment of the application of the "usual residence
rule" to prisoners in Bethel Park occurred in 1971, prior to the explosion in
prison populations.1 72 In subsequent challenges to the "usual residence
rule" that are unrelated to prison populations, courts have continued to grant
wide leeway to the Census Bureau to conduct the census in the way in
which it sees fit.
173
164 See, e.g., id.
165 Id. at 577.
166 id.
167 Id. at 578.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 579-81.
170 ld. at 582.
171 Id.
172 See supra Part II.A. 1.
173 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
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IV. TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS: THE EFFICACY AND
LEGALITY OF STATE BASED ADJUSTMENTS To CENSUS DATA
Three options exist to correct the inequities created by the application
of the "usual residence rule" to the more than 2.2 million incarcerated
people in the United States. i74 First, and least likely in the short term,175 the
Census Bureau could change its enumeration methodology; second, and
also unlikely, the states could individually undertake their own census;
third, states could modify the Census data to meet state priorities and
conceptions of fairness.
76
While the number of congressional seats apportioned to each state is
determined by the federal government, 7 7 it is up to each individual state to
determine the Congressional and state legislative district maps within that
state.178 Thus, while a state legislature may not be able directly to force the
Census Bureau to alter its enumeration policy, the legislature does have
some latitude in determining what data source to use and how to use it.
Therefore, within the Constitutional framework outlined by Reynolds and
Wesberry and their progeny, a state may be able to correct the effects of the
"usual residence rule."' 179
It is worth noting that, symptomatic of the problem at hand, a state
legislator attempting to promote representational fairness in his state will
find, perversely, that the power imbalance this enumeration method creates
makes change a decidedly uphill battle.'8 0 If a legislator is successful in
174 Texas Bill Shows States Could Correct Census Counts of Prisoners, PRISONERS OF
THE CENSUS, July 19, 2004, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/fact-19-7-
2004.shtml°
175 However, Congress recently directed the Bureau of the Census to "undertake a study
on using prisoner's permanent homes of record, as opposed to their incarceration sites, when
determining their residences. The Bureau should report back to the Committee on its
findings within 90 days of enactment of this Act." H.R. REP. No. 109-118, AT 83 (2005)
[hereinafter Congressionally Mandated Study].
176 id.
177 See supra Part I.A.
178 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
179 Id.
180 State legislators around the country have acknowledged that while they may have a
large prison population in their district, they do not consider the inmates to be their
constituents and they are certain that if the prisoners were allowed to vote they would not
vote for the incumbent legislator in the prisons district. See, e.g., Amaris Elliott-Engel, Who
Should Count Auburn's Prisoner's?, CITIZEN (Auburn, N.Y.), Mar. 4, 2005 (quoting New
York State Senator Michael Nozzolio, whose district includes eight prisons, as saying "I
really haven't focused on [state prisoners)"); Counting Urban Prisoners as Rural Residents
Counts out Democracy in New York Senate, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, Dec. 1, 2003,
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/fact-1-12-2003.shtml ("The inmates at Attica
prison in western New York state are represented in Albany by state Sen. Dale Volker, a
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bringing prisoners to his community through new or added prison space or
by annexing a prison from an unincorporated community, and thus gains
power, the representative will be hesitant to change the system.
No state presently attempts to modify Census data to shuffle around a
particular class of state residents prior to congressional apportionment,
though cases in the Wesberry line have certainly left open the prospect. The
possibility of a state modifying Census data, using some other set of data, or
even drawing congressional districts with some level of departure from the
ideal district size is an intriguing, yet difficult course of action. While the
Supreme Court has said that a state interest, consistently applied and
rationally defended may pass muster,' 81 it has not as of yet shed light on any
examples of such a case. However, in light of the strong case for the
inequities created by the present enumeration method and the possibility
that a state could convincingly argue that such modifications were
necessary to further state equality and representational strength, a state
could most certainly test these waters. 
182
While no state modifies Census data for congressional districting, the
State of Kansas offers a useful model in the state legislative arena. Kansas
modifies census population data prior to legislative districting. 183  The
Kansas Constitution calls for a state-run census to be undertaken according
to chapter 61 of the 1987 Session Laws of Kansas 184 for district
apportionment to be undertaken in 1989. Then, in 1992 and in "every tenth
conservative Republican who says it's a good thing his captive constituents can't vote,
because if they could, 'They would never vote for me."'); Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra
note 7, at 303.
I sent to all members of the lower house of the Indiana state legislature a brief survey that
included the following question:
"Which inmate would you feel was more truly a part of your constituency?
"a) An inmate who is currently incarcerated in a prison located in your district, but has no
other ties to your district.
"b) An inmate who is currently incarcerated in a prison in another district, but who lived in
your district before being convicted and/or whose family still lives in your district.
Every single one of the forty respondents who answered the question-regardless of their
political party or the presence or absence of a prison in their district-chose answer (b). Had
the responses been more ambiguous there might have been reason to repeat the survey with
other groups of legislators. However, unless there is something highly anomalous about
Indiana, it is quite clear that representatives do not consider inmates to be constituents of the
districts in which they are incarcerated-unless, of course, they happen to have prior ties to
those districts."
Id.; see also supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
181 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739.
182 See supra Part II.B.
183 See KAN. CONST. art. 10 § 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-205 (1988).
184 Subsequently codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-205 (1988).
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year thereafter"'1 85 the legislature is to draw congressional lines using the
federal Decennial Census published by the Census Bureau.' 86 However, the
Kansas Constitution requires that the legislature modify the Census data
prior to apportionment. 187  These modifications include directives to
reapportion students resident in the state to their legal home address, to
exclude non-resident military, and to include resident military at their legal
residence.188 Interestingly, chapter 61 of the 1987 Session Laws of Kansas
requires a state-run census employing similar enumeration policies, though
they include several additional provisions that are not in line with the
normal U.S. Census Bureau's "usual residence rules."' 189 Specifically,
amongst other provisions, the law requires that the Kansas Secretary of
State
enumerate residents by county, township, city, ward and precinct in which they reside.
For the purpose of determining residence . . .the residence of persons living in
state hospitals and state benevolent and correctional institutions shall be the place
such persons resided before entering the hospital or institution unless such residence
has been abandoned and new legal residence established at the time of such
enumeration.19 1
While the residence of prisoners was defined as their previous address
in the 1989 one-time census, this provision was not readjusted in
subsequent decennial census enumerations while other adjustments were
retained. It is not clear why the change occurred. However, as both the
statute and the constitutional provision were condoned by the Kansas
Supreme Court 192 and no further action was undertaken at either the state or
federal level, it is clear that this type of modification may be made.
In Illinois, where inmate incarceration rates and prison construction
have in many ways mirrored those seen around the nation, 193 journalists and
legislators alike have taken note, and have started to take action. On
February 2, 2005, Democratic Illinois State Representative Arthur L.
Turner from the Ninth District in Chicago, a Deputy Majority Leader in the
Illinois General Assembly, introduced legislation to modify U.S. Census
Bureau data to reallocate prisoners to their last home address prior to




181 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-205 (1988).
190 Id.
191 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-205(f) (1988).
192 In re Stephan, 775 P.2d 663, 670 (1989).
193 LAWRENCE & TRAvis, supra note 9, at 51-52.
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incarceration for redistricting of all state political subdivisions. 94 While
this legislation only affects state legislative districting and not federal
congressional districting or federal population-based funding, it reflects
attempts legislators are making to correct a perceived enumeration injustice,
as well as their belief that such adjustments will pass Constitutional
muster. 195
The legislation introduced by Rep. Turner would mandate that each
governmental entity in the state that "operates a facility for the incarceration
of persons convicted of a criminal offense, including a mental health
institution for those persons, or that places any person convicted or a
criminal offense in a private facility to be incarcerated on behalf of the
governmental entity" shall produce a report including the name, age, and
last address of residence before incarceration of each person incarcerated
within that facility on Census Day. 196 In addition, the same information for
inmates of federal incarceration facilities operated within the state will be
requested from the appropriate body. 19 7 Once such data is acquired, the
Illinois Secretary of State would be required to adjust the Census data such
that it appears as "if the person resided at that address on the day for which
the Census reports population"'198 and remove the prisoner from the
population counts for the district in which the Census Bureau originally
enumerated that prisoner on Census Day.' 99
In the context of Reynolds, it is clear that courts will be less strict in
scrutinizing state legislative districting plans than in the Wesberry-guided
194 1ll. Gen. Assemb. H.B. 0906, 94th Gen. Assemb. (I1l. 2005). A largely identical bill
was introduced in the New York State Senate by Senator Schneiderman. Sen. S. 2754, 2005
(N.Y. 2005). Senator Schneiderman's bill, however, includes adjustments for congressional
districts as well as state legislative districts. Id. § 3-112. In 2001 Texas Representative
Harold Dutton (D-Houston) introduced a similar bill to re-apportion inmates to their pre-
incarceration home of record. H.R. HB 2639, 2001 Leg., 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); Texas
Bill Shows States Could Correct Census Counts of Prisoners, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS,
July 19, 2004, available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/fact-19-7-2004.shtml.
This bill did not pass the Texas legislature, though it was approved by the Elections
Committee. Id. In addition, Kansas has in the past adjusted Census data to reapportion
inmates to their home of record. See supra text accompanying note 148. See also H.R.
1632, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (a proposed bill whereby prisoners whose incarceration
costs are paid for by one state yet housed in another state would be enumerated as a resident
of the state who pays the incarceration costs); see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 42; see
also Congressionally Mandated Study, supra note 175.
195 See ARTHUR L. TURNER, PRISONER CENSUS ADJUSTMENT ACT, H.B. 7338, 93rd Gen.
Assembly State of I11. (2004).
196 Id. § 15.
197 Id. § 20.
198 Id. § 25, cl. 1.
'9' Id. § 25, cl. 2.
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congressional context. 200  However, the trick here is that while a state
interest may be clear, removing prisoners from places like Johnson County
where they make up 20% of the population may violate the principle that
the "resulting apportionment was ... based substantially on population and
the equal population principle., 20 1 As in the Wesberry-guided
congressional context, however, there is certainly an argument that
consistently using corrected population data is in furtherance of a legitimate
state interest.
Stirrings of Rep. Turner's plan have already been seen in one Illinois
County. In Knox County, The Knox County Democratic Central
Committee challenged the Knox County Board's exclusion of Henry C. Hill
Correctional Center from the population base when apportioning the
county's five districts. 20 2 The court ruled that the exclusion of a non vote-
eligible population from the population base did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, stating: "[T]o require that ineligible voters must always
be included in the apportionment base merely because they were included
in the census would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 20 3  The court
presciently continued, clearly delineating the issue at the heart of this
comment, stating:
The problem with the plaintiffs' position would be more readily apparent if the inmate
population were 15,000 rather than 1,248. Under such circumstances, if the plaintiffs'
position were adopted, the few eligible voters residing in the same district as the
inmates would have voting power equal to that of hundreds of eligible voters in other
districts.
204
Clearly, the issue in Knox County was a microcosm of the problem
experienced on a broader scale in Illinois and throughout the nation. The
court continued:
Here, the Board recognized that the same type of vote enhancement and dilution
would occur on a smaller scale unless they took steps to avoid it. Had the Board
adopted the plaintiffs' position and automatically included an extra 1,248 ineligible
voters in a single district, there would have been substantially fewer eligible voters in
that district when compared to the other four districts. Thus, the eligible voters in that
district would have possessed a disproportionate share of voting power. Accordingly,
the Board excluded the non-voting inmates when constructing the districts.
20 5
200 See supra Part III.B.
201 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
202 Knox County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Knox County Bd., 597 N.E.2d 238 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992).
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State legislators around the country would be well served to follow the
lead of the Knox County Board and recognize that the present Census
Bureau enumeration policy results in prison hosting communities holding a
"disproportionate share of voting power" while diluting the representational
strength of non-prison-hosting communities.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years the nation's prison population has grown
dramatically.20 6 By looking at the effects of the U.S. Census Bureau's
"usual residence rule" as it applies to prisoners in Illinois and throughout
the nation, we have seen that a clear injustice for prisoner-exporting
communities has resulted from the policy decision of the U.S. Census
Bureau.20 7 Our Founding Fathers believed that the states would be
imperative to the effective operation of the census, and that the states'
desires to minimize taxation would suppress any desires to expand
208 wt aapopulation rolls. Now, with taxation based on population a thing of the
209past, we see communities across the nation, and particularly in Illinois,
screaming loudly, "yes, in my backyard!" Prisons have proved a great
source of funds for these communities-jobs, political power, and big
money from the federal government. Accordingly, we see a contrary
situation to what we saw 200 years ago-communities want more people
not because they place a premium on representation over money, but
because they want both-and they are getting it.
Prison expansion has happened at an alarming rate.210 Only now are
we starting to come to terms with the number of people we put behind bars
and the drain it creates on our financial and human resources.
Unfortunately, those with disproportionate political power as a result of the
Census Bureau's "usual residence rule" are the ones who will be most
vociferous in their desire to maintain present incarceration policy. 21I
The courts have issued numerous opinions regarding representative
apportionment on the state legislative as well as on the federal
congressional level.212 Unfortunately, it is not precisely clear from these
decisions whether or not a state which altered Census data prior to
apportionment would be overruled by the Court. Fortunately, however,
206 LAWRENCE & TRAviS, supra note 9, at 2.
207 See supra Part lI.B.
208 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
209 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
210 LAWRENCE & TRAviS, supra note 9, at 2.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
212 See supra Part III.B.
2005]
DA VID HAMSHER
there are strong arguments to be made in support of such an attempt, and
there is at least one partial success story.213 Thus, whatever correction
method a state feels to be appropriate, whether it be omitting prisoners from
the apportionment base altogether or whether it be adjusting Census data to
reflect prisoners' true "home of record," the time is ripe for states to make a
bold move to correct the injustices of the "usual residence rule."
213 See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 96
